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Homomorphic encryption is a method of encryption that allows for secure computation of
data. Many industries are moving away from owning expensive high-powered computers and
instead delegating costly computations to the cloud. In an age of data breaches, there is an
inherent risk when putting sensitive data on the cloud. Homomorphic encryption allows one
to securely perform computations on the cloud without allowing the host or any other party
access to the raw data itself. One application being explored is encrypting health data on
low-powered embedded devices, uploading it to a cloud application, performing computations
to assess health risks, and send the results back to the user’s device for decryption and
interpretation. Another application being explored is digital voting.
This thesis aims to provide a summary of the current state-of-the-art of homomorphic
encryption. We will begin by providing the reader with sources for the current main im-
plementations and schemes they are based on. We will then present the mathematical
background used in existing schemes. This includes a background on lattices, cyclotomic
fields, rings of integers, and the underlying believed-to-be-hard problems existing schemes
take advantage of. We will then shift our attention to the FV scheme which is based on the
ring-LWE problem and is one of the main schemes used today. We will then briefly discuss
some optimizations used in FV implementations. Finally, we will look at some probabilistic
experiments which suggest the noise growth in FV is significantly lower than the theoretical
maximum in the average case, and will explore some of the benefits that can be gained.
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1 Introduction
We assume standard undergrad material and terminology. See [DF04] for a comprehen-
sive background in algebra, and [HPS08] for an introductory background in mathematical
cryptography.
Cryptography is the art of concealing communications such that only intended recipients
can read the underlying message. To anyone eavesdropping on the conversation, the encrypted
message, called a ciphertext, appears to be nonsense. In order to decrypt the ciphertext, a
secret decryption key is required. Modern asymmetric cryptography schemes are constructed
such that their security relies on the assumption of some underlying mathematical problem
being difficult to solve. The RSA scheme [RSA78] relies on the assumption that factoring
is difficult, and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [DH76] on the assumption that solving the
discrete log problem is difficult.
In 1978 [RAD+78], Rivest et al. proposed the idea of performing computations on cipher-
texts without requiring the decryption key.
Definition 1.1. For some encryption scheme E , let M, C be rings known as the plaintext
and ciphertext spaces respectively, along with a set K referred to as the key space. Then if
we have encryption and decryption functions
ek :M→ C
dk : C →M
both ring homomorphisms for every k ∈ K, we call E a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
scheme. If there is a bound on the number of additions and multiplications which can be
performed in C such that decryption yields an incorrect result if that bound is exceeded, we
call E a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme. An SHE scheme is often referred
to as a levelled homomorphic encryption scheme in the literature.
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There exist cryptosystems which have homomorphic properties with respect to a single
operation, rather than both ring operations. Some literature may refer to these cryptosystems
as being somewhat homomorphic. To avoid confusion, we adopt no such convention here and
SHE will always mean as in definition 1.1.
Example 1.2 (ElGamal [ElG85]). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order p. Alice
chooses a private key a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}, and computes A = ga. Alice’s public key is
(g, p, A). Bob wishes to encrypt messages m1,m2 ∈ G. He chooses two ephemeral keys k1, k2 ∈
Z and computes the corresponding ciphertexts c1 = (gk1 ,m1 · Ak1), c2 = (gk2 ,m2 · Ak2) and
sends their coordinate-wise product (gk1+k2 ,m1 ·m2 ·Ak1+k2) to Alice. Alice is able to decrypt
by computing
(gk1+k2)−a ·m1 ·m2 · Ak1+k2 = (gk1+k2)−a ·m1 ·m2 · (ga)k1+k2
= m1 ·m2.
We see that the ElGamal scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic.
For 30 years, there was a search for an FHE scheme. In 2009, Gentry introduced the first
FHE scheme in their groundbreaking thesis [Gen09]. They introduce the concept of boot-
strapping, and show that any SHE scheme which has a decryption circuit of low complexity
and can evaluate its own decryption circuit is bootstrappable to an FHE scheme. This re-
lies on a circular security assumption in which an attacker gains no advantage if they have
access to an encrypted key that is encrypted under itself. In section 2 we will introduce the
concept of noise and see how it can lead to incorrect decryption when too much is accumu-
lated. The bootstrapping procedure evaluates the decryption circuit homomorphically, and
therefore “resets” the noise back down to some base level. The result is that we can perform
arbitrarily many operations without requiring decryption. In this thesis, we will look at the
scheme described in [FV12], some optimizations which are commonly used, and examine ways
to increase the depth of a circuit before decryption or bootstrapping is required.
2
Table 1.1: Homomorphic Encryption Implementations
Library name Languages Supported schemes
HElib C++ BGV, CKKS
SEAL C++, .NET BFV, CKKS
Palisade C++ BFV, BGV, CKKS, TFHE




There are several standard sources used for the research area of homomorphic encryption we
will focus on. When focusing on the hard problems that homomorphic encryption schemes are
based off of, we primarily look at the ones based on learning with errors and ring learning with
errors problems [Reg05, LPR10] which we will discuss in chapter 2. Most implementations
are in the ring learning with errors setting. There are two primary schemes used in HE
libraries [BGV14, FV12] and they perform exact integer arithmetic. In addition, there is a
scheme for performing arithmetic on approximate numbers [CKKS17]. There are also more
recent works [BLLN13, CGGI19] which perform integer arithmetic, with the latter work
focusing on a fast bootstrapping operation and bootstrapping after every operation. In this
thesis, we focus on the scheme introduced in [FV12] and discuss a variant of it in [BEHZ17] of
which Microsoft has implemented and made open source. There is a homomorphic encryption
standards organization trying to standardize homomorphic encryption; they provide a list
of libraries implementing various schemes as well as papers [ACC+18] providing suggested
parameters based on the currently best-known attacks. Some implementations along with
the schemes they implement are listed in Table 1.1.
Remark 1.3. The FV scheme introduced in [FV12] is sometimes referred to as the BFV
scheme in the literature. This is because the authors of [FV12] ported the scheme proposed
in [Bra12] to the ring-LWE setting. In this thesis we will refer to the scheme as FV, except
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as seen in table 1.1.
Parameter selection is often done using an online tool [APS15] based on [Pla18]. The
primary homomorphic encryption scheme implementation we will refer to is [Lai17]. We make
a note that this paper is slightly dated and there have been some significant changes in SEAL
since publication of [Lai17]. When one wants to consider fully homomorphic encryption, there
is no better resource than Gentry’s thesis [Gen09] in which they introduce the concept of
bootstrapping. At the time of this writing, bootstapping appears to be the only known way
of achieving fully homomorphic encryption.
4
2 Background
This chapter aims to provide the mathematical background necessary for understanding
modern homomorphic encryption schemes. We will provide a brief introduction to lattices
and lattice problems, some algebraic number theory, and we will look at the problems that
homomorphic encryption schemes are based on.
2.1 Notation
We will use the standard notation that is used in [FV12].
We recall the mth cyclotomic polynomial Φm(x) to be the unique irreducible polynomial








The degree of Φm(x) is ϕ(m) where ϕ(m) is the Euler phi function. We will typically
work with m a power of 2 so that Φm(x) = x
m/2 + 1.
We will work with the quotient ring R = Z[x]/〈Φm(x)〉. Here, we use 〈·〉 to denote the ideal
generated by elements within the angled brackets. We will denote elements of R in lowercase




0 ≤ i < ϕ(m). In other words, we will work with the canonical representatives. Matrices will
be denoted by uppercase bold, and by an abuse of notation, we will also denote vectors of a
lattice in lowercase bold.
For q ∈ Z, we let Zq denote the set of canonical representatives of Z/qZ in (−q/2, q/2].
We let Rq denote the ring R with coefficients in Zq. We stress that Zq is not the ring Z/qZ,
but is in fact a set, and so elements of Rq have coefficients in (−q/2, q/2].
By a slight abuse of notation, we will let 〈·, ·〉 denote the standard inner product keeping
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in mind we are always working with elements whose degrees are less than ϕ(m), and so
〈f ,g〉 =
∑
ri · si where ri, si are the coefficients of f ,g respectively. Clarification will be
provided if it is not clear from the context whether we are denoting an ideal or an inner
product. We will let b·c and d·e denote rounding down and rounding up respectively. We
let b·e denote rounding to the nearest integer; in case of any ambiguity we round up. We
let [·]q denote reduction modulo q in the range (−q/2, q/2] and |·|q denote the least positive
residue modulo q. When we say “reduce modulo q”, we are applying [·]q unless otherwise
stated. When working with elements of R, the operations b·cq, |·|q, and b·e are performed
coefficient-wise.
When given a probability distribution D, we denote sampling an element e from D by
e← D. When D is the uniform distribution U , we denote sampling by e $←− U . We will often
sample e ∈ R from D. By this, we mean that the coefficients are each sampled individually
from D. We say D is B-bounded if it is supported on the interval [−B,B].
We will take ‖·‖ to mean the infinity norm, that is ‖v‖ = max {|vi|}. We will otherwise




i . In the case when v ∈ R, we will take
‖v‖ to mean reduce modulo Φm(x) before applying ‖·‖.
When working with elements f ∈ Rq, we will let f [i] denote the ith coefficient in f . This
is the notation most commonly used in the literature. It is not to be confused with applying
[·]q, and clarification will be provided if the context is not clear.
2.1.1 Ring Expansion Factor
When ring elements are multiplied together and reduced modulo Φm(x), it is possible for
their norm to increase as a result. The maximum factor which they may expand by is called
the expansion factor of the ring and is defined as δR = sup
{
‖f ·g‖
‖f‖·‖g‖ for all f ,g ∈ R \ {0}
}
.
We have δR finite if R is a ring that is finite-dimensional as a vector space. To see this, we
note that the function in δR is homogeneous as a function of f and g, so it is determined
by its values on f ,g of norm 1. This is a compact set, and a continuous function attains
its maximum on a compact set. In the case of R as defined above, we can work out this
expansion factor explicitly.
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Lemma 2.1. Let R = Z[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉. Then δR = n.










their product prior to reduction, with ck =
∑k
j=0 ajbk−j. Reducing modulo x
n + 1 is done by





j=k+1 ajbn+k−j which has at most n products to sum. Then
‖f · g‖ = ‖h‖ ≤ n · ‖f‖ · ‖g‖
gives us an upper bound of n for δR. To see this is a least upper bound, take f ,g to have
coefficients all 1s and we get δR = n.
We will see below in chapter 5 that this maximum bound is attained quite rarely.
2.2 Lattices
Let v1, . . . ,vm be a set of linearly independent vectors in Rn. The lattice Λ generated by





aivi | ai ∈ Z
}
.
If v1, . . . ,vm are linearly independent, they are said to be a basis for Λ. If Λ is a full-rank
lattice, that is m = n, we can define its dual lattice
Λ∗ = {x ∈ Rn | ∀v ∈ Λ, 〈x,v〉 ∈ Z} .




αijvj, αij ∈ Z.
The aij’s form an invertible m×m matrix A. Then U = AV. We have that 1 = det(AA−1) =
det(A) det(A−1). Both A and A−1 have integer coefficients, so det(A), det(A−1) ∈ Z. The
only units in Z are ±1, so det(A) = ±1 and we say that A is a unimodular matrix.
An integer lattice is an additive subgroup of Zn. That is, it is a lattice whose vectors all
have integer coordinates. If Λ satisfies qZn ⊆ Λ ⊆ Zn, we say Λ is a q-ary lattice.
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Definition 2.2. For a lattice Λ with a basis {v1, . . . ,vm}. We define the standard funda-
mental domain of Λ to be the n-dimensional parallelepiped




tivi | 0 ≤ ti < 1
}
.
Definition 2.3. For a lattice Λ of dimension m and fundamental domain F , we define the
determinant det(Λ) of Λ to be Vol(F) the volume of the standard fundamental domain. This
is also called the covolume of Λ since it is the volume of the quotient group Rn/Λ.
Remark 2.4. The volume of a fundamental domain does not depend on the choice of funda-
mental domain, at least as long as one avoids pathologies (for example, by insisting that the
domain is Lebesgue measurable). We will work consistently with the standard fundamental
domain.
If dim Λ = n, then we can form a square matrix F (V ) by the rows of the basis vectors V
of Λ and compute Vol(F) by
Vol(F) = |det(F (V ))| .
The volume of the standard fundamental domain is independent of the basis chosen for Λ.
To see this, we let U, V be any two bases for Λ related by a unimodular matrix A. Then
Vol(F(V )) = |det(F (V ))|
= |det(AF (U))|
= |det(A) det(F (U))|
= |±1| |det(F (U)|
= Vol(F(U)).
Definition 2.5. The ith successive minimum, λi = λi(Λ), of a lattice Λ is the radius r of
the smallest ball such that there are i linearly independent vectors of length ‖vi‖2 ≤ r. It is
clear that 0 < λ1 ≤ · · · ≤ λn.
2.2.1 Ideal Lattices
We can form lattices based on ideals of rings.
8
Definition 2.6. If we let f(x) ∈ Z[x] be a monic polynomial of degree n, and R =
Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉 be a ring then we have R ∼= Zn by xi 7→ ei where the eis are the standard
basis vectors of Zn. Ideals of I ⊆ R also form lattices which are isomorphic to sublattices of
Zn. Such a lattice is called an ideal lattice.
We remark that although the ideals of R all form lattices in Zn, not all sublattices of Zn
correspond to some ideal in R.
Example 2.7. Let Λ = Z[x]/ 〈x2 + 1〉. Consider the sublattice generated by the basis b1 =
(1 + 5x),b2 = (1 + 2x). In this sublattice, multiplication by x corresponds to π/2 rotation.
The vector −7 · b1 + 2 · b2 = −5− 31x is in this sublattice, but x · (−5− 31x) = (31− 5x)
is not in the sublattice, and therefore it is not generated by an ideal since ideals are closed
under multiplication.
Ideal lattices and their applications to cryptography were first introduced [LM06] as a
generalization of a cyclic lattice (i.e., a lattice Λ such that rot(Λ) = Λ, where rot maps
xi 7→ x(i+1 mod n)).
We recall that ideals are closed under both addition and scalar multiplication by elements
in R. This additional structure is what makes ideal lattices an appealing candidate for HE
schemes, and in fact is what Gentry uses in [Gen09] to construct an FHE scheme.
2.3 Cyclotomic Fields
We will now give some background on the algebraic structures used. We begin by recalling
some definitions. In this section, modular arithmetic may be performed in the usual way and
is not restricted to a set of representatives as in section 2.1. For the following definitions, we
let K/F be a field extension.
Definition 2.8. An element α ∈ K is said to be algebraic over F if it is the root of some
polynomial in F [x]. If every element of K is algebraic over F , then we say K/F is algebraic.
If K/F is a finite field extension, then K/F is algebraic. The converse is not true.








5, . . . ) the field extension generated by all square roots of prime numbers
is an infinite, algebraic extension.
Definition 2.9. If F = Q, and K = Q(α) a finite extension for some α algebraic over Q,
then we say α is an algebraic number and K is an algebraic number field, or simply a number
field. If α is a root of a monic polynomial in Z[x], we call α an algebraic integer.
Recall that for a number field K = Q(α), there exists a unique irreducible polynomial
f(x) ∈ Q[x] whose root is α. This polynomial is called the minimal polynomial of α, and
deg f(x) = [K : Q] (i.e. the dimension of K as a vector space over Q). If we let the minimal





i | ai ∈ Q, 0 ≤ i < n
}
.
We then clearly have K ∼= Q[x]/ 〈f(x)〉 given by α 7→ x.
Definition 2.10. For any positive integer m, and ζm a primitive mth root of unity, the mth





whose roots are all the primitive mth roots of unity.
We obtain the mth cyclotomic field K = Q(ζm) by adjoining an mth primitive root of
unity ζm to Q. The dimension of K over Q as a vector space is equal to ϕ(m). In this paper,
we primarily concern ourselves with cyclotomic number fields.
2.3.1 Rings of Integers
Definition 2.11. Let K be a number field. The set of all algebraic integers in K is called
the ring of integers of K and is denoted OK .
It is worth noting OK is indeed a subring of K. When we say “ring of integers,” it is
implied we are referring to the ring of integers of some number field K. To avoid confusion,
we will refer to Z as the rational integers.
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Definition 2.12. A unique factorization domain (UFD) is an integral domain in which
every non-zero element can be written uniquely as a product of irreducible elements up to
permutation and multiplication by units.
The rational integers are a UFD as all integers factor uniquely into a product of prime
powers, but in general this is not the case with the ring of integers.
Example 2.13. Let K = Q[
√
−5], then we have OK = Z[
√
−5]. In this ring, 6 = 2 · 3 and








−5) are all irreducible elements in
OK , so we have two different factorizations of 6 into irreducible elements.
In general, unique factorization does not hold in OK , but as it turns out this concept of
unique factorization may be generalized. We make use of the following results from algebraic
number theory.
Theorem 2.14. Every ideal in a Dedekind domain factors uniquely into a product of prime
ideals.
Proof. See [Neu13, thm. 3.3]
Theorem 2.15. The ring of integers is a Dedekind domain.
Proof. See [Neu13, thm. 3.1]
So it is clear that although elements may not factor uniquely in the ring of integers, ideals
of OK factor uniquely into products of prime ideals. This allows us to begin discussion on
the splitting of primes in the ring of integers.
Definition 2.16. Let K be a number field and OK its ring of integers. A prime p ∈ Z is
said to split if 〈p〉 ∈ OK can be written as a non-trivial product of prime ideals in OK . If this
product is square-free, we say p splits completely, and p is ramified if it is not square-free. If
the only factorization of p is the trivial one, we say p remains prime in OK .
Example 2.17. Consider the ring of Gaussian integers Z[i]. In this ring we can write 5 =
(1+2i)(1−2i), and so 5 splits. It can be shown that every prime p of the form p ≡ 1 (mod 4)
splits. Conversely, if p ≡ 3 (mod 4), then p does not split and remains prime. Furthermore,
we have 2 = u(1 + i)2 where u is some unit in Z[i], and so 2 is ramified.
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Theorem 2.18. The ring of integers of Q(ζm) is Z[ζm].
Proof. See [Was97, thm. 2.6].
Remark 2.19. The examples we have seen so far have involved number rings of the form
K = Q(α) and their corresponding rings of integers have been OK = Z[α]; in general we do
not always have OK = Z[α]. One nice feature of cyclotomic fields is that their ring of integers
is always monogenic.
Theorem 2.20. Let K = Q(ζm), p prime with p - m, and f the order of p mod m. Then p
splits into ϕ(m)/f distinct primes in Z[ζm].
Proof. See [Was97, thm. 2.13].
When considering the mth cyclotomic field, we have OK = Z[ζm] ∼= Z[x]/ 〈Φm(x)〉, and
Theorem 2.20 tells us that primes of the form p ≡ 1 mod m split completely. Another result
from number theory tells us exactly how to find these prime factors. We give the special
instance of this method, namely when OK = Z[α] for K = Q(α).
Theorem 2.21. Let p ∈ Z prime, and K and OK as above. Let f be the minimal polynomial
of α over Q. Let f̄ denote the image of f in (Z/pZ)[x]. We factor f̄ as
f̄(x) = f̄1 · f̄2 · · · · · f̄r.
Then pOK factors uniquely in OK as
pOK = pe11 pe22 . . . perr
where pi = pOK + 〈fi(α)〉 = 〈p, fi(α)〉 and ei = deg fi.
Proof. See [Neu13, prop. 8.3]
For algorithms on factoring polynomials modulo p, see [Coh13].
Theorem 2.21 shows we can find a factorization of p simply by factoring a cyclotomic
polynomial modulo p and evaluating each of its factors at ζm. Since we know primes of the
form p ≡ 1 mod m split completely in Z[ζm], Φm(x) must factor into exactly n = ϕ(m) linear
factors. Since (Z/pZ)× is cyclic of order p − 1, it has some generator g. We have m | p − 1,
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and so there exists a unique subgroup of order m with a generator of the form a = (g(p−1)/m).
Each linear factor in the factorization of Φm modulo p is given by (x− ai) for i ∈ (Z/mZ)×.
Finally, by the CRT this gives an isomorphism






p, ζ im − ai
〉
.
Each of the factors in the product of quotients is prime and therefore maximal, so each factor
is isomorphic to a field, namely Z/pZ. This gives (Z/pZ)[x]/Φm ∼= (Z/pZ)n. We conclude
this section with an example of splitting a prime.
Example 2.22. Let K = Q(ζ8) be the eighth cyclotomic field. The minimal polynomial of
ζ8 is Φ8(x) = x
4 + 1. If we choose p = 17, then Φ8 factors as (x+ 2) · (x+ 8) · (x+ 9) · (x+ 15)
modulo p. By theorem 2.21, we have that 5 splits as 5OK = 〈5, ζ8 + 2〉 ·〈5, ζ8 + 8〉 ·〈5, ζ8 + 9〉 ·
〈5, ζ8 + 15〉.
Implementations will typically impose congruence conditions on p for this splitting prop-
erty, and allows us to work over a finite field of order p rather than some extension field.
This CRT isomorphism allows us to perform pointwise multiplication. An application of this
is single instruction, multiple data (SIMD).
2.4 Cryptographically Hard Problems
In this section we will examine the underlying hard problems that homomorphic encryption
schemes are based on.
Definition 2.23. Given a lattice Λ, the Shortest Vector Problem(SVP) is to find a shortest
non-zero vector in the lattice Λ. In terms of the notation used above, find a vector v ∈ Λ
such that ‖v‖2 = λ1(Λ).
Remark 2.24. There may be more than one shortest vector in Λ. For example, if we work in
the integer lattice Z2, the vectors (0,±1), (±1, 0) are solutions to SVP. In a lattice, there are
always finitely many shortest vectors.
The SVP problem is known to be NP-hard under randomized reductions [Ajt98].
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Definition 2.25. Given a lattice Λ and a target vector t ∈ Rn such that t /∈ Λ, the Closest
Vector Problem (CVP) is to find a vector v ∈ Λ such that ‖t− v‖2 is minimized.
There are several variants of SVP and CVP. Below we will let γ ≥ 1 be an approximation
factor and we will let d(t,Λ) be the distance of a vector t ∈ Rn to the closest lattice point in
Λ. In the γ = 1 case, we get the versions of these problems introduced above.
Definition 2.26. Given a lattice Λ, the γ-Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (SVPγ) is
to find a non-zero vector v ∈ Λ such that ‖v‖2 ≤ γ · λ1(Λ).
Definition 2.27. Given a lattice Λ and a target vector t ∈ Rn, the γ-Approximate Closest
Vector Problem (CVPγ) is to find a vector v ∈ Λ such that ‖t− v‖2 ≤ γ · d(t,Λ).
Definition 2.28. Given a lattice Λ, the γ-Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVPγ) is
to find linearly independent vectors v1, . . . ,vn such that ‖vi‖ ≤ γλn(Λ)
Definition 2.29. Given a basis B of a lattice Λ(B), and a target vector t such that d(t,Λ) ≤
γ · λ1(Λ), the γ-Bounded Distance Decoding Problem (BDDγ) is to find a vector y ∈ Λ such
that ‖y − t‖2 < d(t,Λ).
Definition 2.30. We let Znq denote n-dimensional vectors with coefficients modulo q. Given
vectors a1, . . . am ∈ Znq , and a bound β < q, The Short Integer Solutions Problem(SIS) is to
find a non-trivial, “short” z ∈ Zm such that
Az = 0 (mod q)
where A = [a1| . . . |am]. We require ‖z‖ ≤ β otherwise we can simply use Gaussian elimination
to solve for z.
In SIS, the matrix A defines a lattice
Λ(A)⊥ = {z ∈ Zm : Az = 0 (mod q)}
and the problem becomes finding a shortest vector in Λ(A). In 1996, Ajtai gave a reduction
from worst-case GapSVP and SIVP to average-case SIS[Ajt96].
14
2.4.1 Learning with Errors
The Learning with Errors problem (LWE) was first introduced by Regev in 2005 [Reg05].
We look at two versions of the LWE problem.
Definition 2.31. Let n, q ∈ Z and χ a probability distribution on Z often referred to as the
error distribution. Then the Search-LWE problem is to find a vector s ∈ Znq given m noisy
inner products
b1 = 〈s, a1〉+ e1
...
bm = 〈s, am〉+ em
where ai
$←− Znq and ei ← χ.
Definition 2.32. Let n, q, χ as in definition 2.31, A = (a1, . . . , am) with ai
$←− Znq and
e = (e1, . . . , em) with ei ← χ. Then for some s ∈ Znq , the Decision-LWE problem is to
distinguish between (A, sTA + eT ) and (A,vT ) with v
$←− Zmq .
We typically choose χ to be a spherical Gaussian distribution centred around the origin
with width αq >
√
n for some α.
Let A ∈ Zm×nq to be the m × n matrix representing each random vector ai. If we have
m ≤ n, we can solve the above system using Gaussian elimination. However, since Gaussian
elimination uses row operations, this makes any error terms grow and our solution will effec-
tively be a random vector. If we have m > n, then adding the error term to Im(A) moves
outside of Im(A) due to being in a higher dimensional space. This makes it impossible for
Gaussian elimination to return anything since there is a high probability an arbitrary vector
in a higher-dimensional space won’t have a pre-image; in other words, the system will almost
certainly be inconsistent.
The LWE problem is provably as hard as some worst-case lattice problems. Regev gives a
quantum reduction from GapSVP and SIVP to LWE [Reg05], and a classical reduction from
GapSVP to LWE is given in [BLP+13].
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2.4.2 Cryptographic Applications
Using the LWE problem, we can create an asymmetric key cryptography scheme. We begin
by looking at the scheme proposed by Regev [Reg05], and later examine the variant in [FV12].
First, we choose public parameters n, q,m, σ with the variable n being the dimension of the
vector space we are working with, q a prime modulus, m the number of equations in our
system, and σ the standard deviation of the probability distribution χ on Zq. The remainder
of the scheme is as follows:
• Private Key: Choose a secret vector s ∈ Znq .
• Public Key: Choose a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq uniformly at random, and sample e ∈ χmq .
Return the public key as pk = (A,b = A · s + e) ∈ Zm×nq ×Zmq . We note that the noise
e is exposed by taking pk[0] · s− pk[1].
• Encrypt: Encryption is done on each bit x of the message as follows: choose a uniformly




〈b, s〉) ∈ Znq × Zq if x = 1.
• Decrypt: Given the ciphertext pair (a, b), return 0 if b − 〈a, s〉 is closer to 0 than to
b q
2
c, and 1 otherwise.
2.5 Ring-LWE
For the Ring Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE) problem, we modify the LWE problem
slightly. First, we let Φm(x) be the mth cyclotomic polynomial. We choose q ∈ Z with q ≡ 1
mod m. We let R = Z[x]/ 〈Φm(x)〉 be a polynomial quotient ring and we let Rq = R/Zq
be the polynomial quotient ring with coefficients in (−q/2, q/2]. For efficiency reasons, we
usually choose m to be a power of 2. This gives more efficient algorithms for multiplication
discussed in chapter 4. We choose a secret polynomial s ∈ Rq as before. We let As,χ be the
distribution in Rq × Rq obtained by sampling a ∈ Rq uniformly at random, e ∈ Rq the
polynomial with coefficients obtained by sampling from χ like before, and returning the pair
(a,b = a · s + e) ∈ Rq ×Rq.
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Definition 2.33. The Search Ring Learning with Errors Problem (Search Ring-LWE) is to
determine the secret s ∈ Rq by sampling pairs (ai,bi) from As,χ.
Definition 2.34. Given samples of pairs (ai,bi) as above, the Decision Ring Learning with
Errors Problem (Decision Ring-LWE) is to distinguish between pairs sampled uniformly at
random and pairs sampled according to the distribution As,χ.
2.5.1 Cryptographic Application
We will first look at a basic scheme introduced in [LPR10] when the ring-LWE problem was
first introduced.
As with LWE, we choose a prime modulus q with the extra condition that q ≡ 1 mod 2d
where d is a power of 2, and χ an error distribution on Zq. We work with elements in the
ring Rq = Zq[x]/〈xd + 1〉. The steps are then as follows:
• Private Key: Choose a secret s ∈ R with coefficients sampled from χ.
• Public Key: Choose an element a $←− Rq and output the pair pk = (a,b = a · s + e) ∈
Rq ×Rq where e is an error term chosen from the error distribution. As with LWE, we
see that the noise e is exposed by taking pk[0] · s− pk[1].
• Encrypt: The plaintext space is Rt. The authors of [LPR10] use the t = 2 case, but
we are not restricted to working with t = 2, and so will consider the general case here.
To encrypt a message m ∈ Rt, we begin by sampling three small error terms u, e1, e2
from our error distribution. We then compute
c1 = [a · u + e1]q
c2 =
[








The ciphertext we output is ct = (c1, c2) ∈ Rq ×Rq.
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• Decrypt: To decrypt a pair ct = (c1, c2), we first compute




·m− a · u · s− e1 · s mod q









·m + (e · u + e2 − e1 · s) mod q.
We refer to the term in parentheses as the noise term, and it is denoted by v. We see
that if we scale the above expression by t
q
and round, that as long as the noise isn’t too
large, we recover the message m.
Lemma 2.35. For a ciphertext c with noise as above, and a
$←− Rq, s,u, e1, e2 ← D where









































Since the final step of decryption is applying [·], we can simply drop tr. Then to decrypt
correctly we require
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It is worth noting that the literature has conflicting values for the bound on v. In [FV12],




c and omit the details of the proof; [BEHZ17] gives the
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[Pla18]. Player’s work differs slightly from above and so uses the fact that |q|t < t to
get their bound. Player’s bound is more of a worst-case scenario, but not necessary since we
know the values q, t. The bound in [FV12] appears to be incorrect, and we therefore use the
bound above and found in [BEHZ17]. Proving the bound given in [FV12] would be a stronger
result since it would permit a higher bound on the noise before decryption or bootstrapping
is required.
An advantage of the ring-LWE scheme presented is that key sizes are reduced compared
to the LWE scheme. The LWE cryptosystem required m×n samples and a matrix product to
give m random scalars, while its ring-LWE counterpart only required sampling n coefficients
followed by a polynomial multiplication. This increased efficiency is why most state-of-the-art
implementations of FHE are based on ring-LWE rather than LWE.
On the matter of hardness of ring-LWE, a quantum reduction from worst-case SVPγ on
ideal lattices to search ring-LWE is given in [LPR10]. Furthermore, the best-known attacks
on ideal lattices appear to have no significant advantage compared to those on a random
lattice. Since LWE-based schemes are reducible to worst-case lattice problems, parameter




In this thesis we will focus on the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme proposed
in 2012 by Fan and Vercauteren [FV12]. They introduce a ring-LWE variant of Brakerski’s
scheme in [Bra12] which builds from the scheme proposed in [LPR10]. There is a difference
of a sign and order with the public keys in [FV12] compared to [LPR10], and we adopt
the convention used in [FV12] for convenience with decryption, and the notation is as de-
fined in chapter 2. We will also look at optimizations to FV, parameter selection, and an
implementation of FV, namely Microsoft’s Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL).
The problem with the scheme proposed above is that ciphertexts grow in size. Multiplying
two ciphertexts together results in a ciphertext containing three terms. The FV scheme
introduces the idea of relinearization. If we view the two components of our ciphertexts as
being coefficients in Rq[y], then we can see that ciphertexts are initially linear. If we multiply
two ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ Rq[y], we end up with something quadratic. Relinearization allows us
to shrink this quadratic ciphertext product into something linear. When we view ciphertexts
as elements of Rq[y], we can view the first step of decryption as evaluating the ciphertext at
s where s ∈ Rq is the secret key.
3.1 Homomorphic Operations
The two operations we work with are addition and multiplication. As mentioned above, we
will view our ciphertexts as elements in Rq[y]. We will write ct(y) = c0 +c1 ·y. If we evaluate
ct(y) at its secret key s and reduce modulo q, we get




·m + v. (3.1)
The reversal of the terms using addition rather than subtraction here is due to the difference




The goal here is to take two ciphertexts ct1, ct2, add them together, and have their sum
decrypt to the sum of their respective plaintexts m1, m2 ∈ Rt. If we evaluate the ciphertexts
at s as above and add them, we obtain













· (m1 + m2) + v1 + v2.
In order to add the mi’s, we need to reduce modulo t afterwards. We have m1 + m2 =
[m1 + m2]t + t · r for some r ∈ R. Simplifying above gives













· [m1 + m2]t +
q
t
















< 1. From the appearance of the v1 + v2 term above, we see the
noise grows additively. That is, the noise of our new ciphertext is simply the sum of the noise
of the previous ciphertexts, up to some additional factor that is at most t.
3.1.2 Multiplication
As previously mentioned, multiplication introduces a new problem: we end up with a cipher-
text with three elements. To see why this is the case, we recall that ciphertexts are linear
elements of R[y] and so their product must be quadratic. It is worth noting this is a valid
ciphertext that will decrypt if we evaluate it at s as in (3.1) prior to reduction modulo q. We
explain below how this works.
Similar to what we did with addition, we begin by writing out our cipherexts evaluated









·m2 + v2 + q · r2.
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If we carry out this multiplication in the natural way, we get













· (m1 · r2 + m2 · r1) + q(v1 · r2 + v2 · r1) + v1 · v2 + q2 · r1 · r2.
If we want to decrypt this in the usual way and recover m1 ·m2, we see there is an extra
factor of bq/tc we need to get rid of before we can scale by t/q and round. The natural way to
deal with this is to scale the above product by bq/tc−1. The problem with doing this is that
the term q2 ·r1 ·r2 will more than likely require rounding, and we will not be able to remove it
when reducing modulo q. The term q2 · bq/tc−1 can be as large as q/2 after reduction modulo
q. The authors of [FV12] work around this by using the approximation
t
q


















· s2 + ra
where ra is an error term from approximating. With this approximation, the authors are able
to get rid of the extra factor of bq/te at the cost of some extra error.






, and ct1 · ct2(y) =
























·m1 ·m2 + v3.
where ‖v3‖ < 2 · δR · t · E · (δR · ‖s‖+ 1) + 2 · t2 · δ2R · (‖s‖+ 1)2.
Proof. See [FV12, lem. 2].
The above is an example of multiplying two ciphertexts that are linear in R[y]; the result
is a ciphertext that is quadratic in R[y]. Classical FV only allows multiplication of degree
1 ciphertexts in R[y] and bundles the relinearization method described below as part of the
overall multiplication process. As it turns out, we can repeatedly use the above technique to
multiply ciphertexts of arbitrary size, and this is what is done in [Lai17]. More concretely, if
we have two ciphertexts ct1 = (c
′
0, . . . , c
′
k), ct2 = (d
′
0, . . . ,d
′
l) ∈ R[y] of degrees k, l, with
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j=k+1 mj respectively, then we can write
ct3(s) =
〈







· [m1 · . . .mk+l]t + v



















We first concern ourselves with classical FV (i.e., dealing with ciphertexts consisting of three
elements).
Now that we have a way to multiply ciphertexts, we see the problem is that our ciphertext
is quadratic in y rather than linear (i.e., it has three terms instead of two). In the original
FV scheme, this would only allow us to perform a single multiplication and then we would
need to decrypt the result. The authors introduce a technique called relinearization to bring
the ciphertext back down to having two terms. They give two versions of relinearization, but
we will only focus our attention on the first version.
The idea of relinearizing is to convert the above quadratic ciphertext into an equivalent
linear one at the cost of some extra noise. In other words, if we have a quadratic ciphertext
ct(y) = c0 + c1 · y + c2 · y2, and its “equivalent” linear ciphertext ct′(y) = c′0 + c′1 · y, we
want to write
[
c0 + c1 · s + c2 · s2
]
q
= [c′0 + c
′
1 · s + r]q (3.2)
where r is a small error term from relinearizing. We need to keep in mind that relinearization
is an operation that happens homomorphically, so we can only work with the public key. The
technique used is to find a way to provide a masked copy of s2 in much the same way we mask
s in the public key. We do this by generating an extra public key called a relinearization key
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denoted rlk. If we use the same method as with the public key, the obvious way of choosing
rlk would be rlk = (−(a · s + e) + s2, a), with a $←− Rq, e← χ, and as we did with the public
key in 2, we can compute rlk[0] + rlk[1] · s = s2 − e. With this in mind, we can see the
natural way to choose c′0 and c
′
1 is
c′0 = c0 + rlk[0] · c2 (3.3)
c′1 = c1 + rlk[1] · c2. (3.4)
If we apply the first step of the decryption algorithm, and use the fact that rlk[0]+rlk[1]·s =
c2 − e, we get
c′0 + c
′
1 · s = c0 + c1 · s + c2 · s2 − c2 · e. (3.5)
The authors of [FV12] acknowledge it is not as simple as providing a masked copy of s2 in the
exact same way as the public key because the multiplication of the error term e with c2 could
result in a massive increase in error due to c2 being a random element in Rq (i.e., having
norm q/2). The first version of relinearization proposed [FV12] is to convert the coefficients
of c2 into some other base T that has smaller norm. We emphasize that this new base T is
unrelated to the plaintext value T and is not chosen with respect to t. In fact, as we will see
below, it is chosen with respect to the ciphertext modulus q. To avoid confusion, some works
use w to represent the base change instead. As the authors of [FV12], we stick with T in this
thesis.
Example 3.2. Let f(x) = 12 + 3x+ 9x2 + x4, and T = 2. Then we can decompose f as
f(x) = (x+ x2 + x4) · 20 + (x) · 21 + (1) · 22 + (1 + x2) · 23.
This idea of decomposing c2 into a smaller base is used in several schemes [FV12, BGV14,
BV14, BEHZ17].




2 · T i with l = blogT (q)c.
However, we must be careful with how we compute this. We cannot simply choose any
representative modulo q or T , but we must remain consistent. That is, we either need to
always remain centered modulo q or convert to the least positive residue. We present an
algorithm to explicitly show how to perform this base conversion.
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Algorithm 1: BaseDecomp(cm, T )
Input: cm the degree m− 1 coefficient of a ciphertext ct ∈ Rq[y] with deg ct >= 2
and T a positive integer with T < q
Output: (c
(0)
m , . . . c
(l)
m ), where l = blogT (q)c, and c
(i)





m · T i
1 l← logT q;
2 for i = 0 to l do
/* Operations are done coefficient-wise */
3 c
(i)
m ← [cm]T ; /* Centered reduction of cm mod T */




m , . . . , c
(l)
m );
When we slice c2 up in this way, we can make a minor adjustment to the above proposed
method of choosing rlk to get a new way to relinearize. The idea is to provide a relinearization
key as above, but with l varying powers of T all scaling s2. This gives us a length l key of























Now it can easily be seen that this relinearizes exactly as we want. Furthermore, the error
does not grow too much because our error terms are now multiplied by c
(i)
2 ∈ RT where T
was chosen so all of the c
(i)
2 ’s have small norm.
Just as we generalized multiplication and addition to ciphertexts of arbitrary lengths, so
too can we generalize relinearization. The process is as follows:
• Let ct = (c0, . . . , cm) be a degree m ciphertext in Rq[y].
• Select a base T as above, with l = blogT qc.
• Generate m−1 relinearization keys rlki = (−(aj ·s+ej)+T j ·si, aj), j ∈ [0, l], i ∈ [2,m].
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with j ∈ [2,m].
The obvious drawback to supporting relinearization of ciphertexts of arbitrary size is that
we would need to know a priori how large of ciphertexts we will encounter, and we need to
handle more keys. At the time of this writing, this seems to be the best known way to handle
relinearizing ciphertexts of arbitrary size.
For simplicity, we will work with a ciphertext of degree 2. If we apply the first step of










2 · ei (3.11)
then we expose the noise added from relinearizing. We see that the newly added noise is∑l
i=0 c2 · ei. Therefore, the upper bound on the noise introduced by relinearizing is given by
(l+1) · T
2
·B ·δR. First, we note that the noise introduced is additive and not at all dependent
on the ciphertexts being relinearized. Second, if we want to generalize this to a ciphertext of
arbitrary degree m ≥ 2, we simply need to multiply the above bound by m− 1.
3.3 Multiplicative Depth
As we have seen, homomorphic addition increases noise additively, but homomorphic multipli-
cation increases noise significantly more, even when not paired with relinearizing. According
to Lemma 3.1, a single multiplication increases the noise by a factor of roughly1 2 · t · δ2R · ‖s‖.
Choosing s of small norm helps keep this noise growth low, but the ring constant and our
1For brevity, we will only consider the dominant term here.
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choice of plaintext modulus clearly play a significant role in noise growth. Due to the major
role multiplication plays in noise growth compared to addition, the literature often refers to
the depth of a circuit as the number of multiplications that may be performed before either
decryption or a bootstrapping operation is required. We present the multiplicative depth for
the classical FV scheme where multiplication only happens with linear ciphertexts in Rq[y].
Theorem 3.4. Let the notation be as above, along with χ a B-bounded probability distribu-
tion. The FV scheme has multiplicative depth L and decrypts properly provided
4 · δLR · (δR + 1.25)L+1 · tL−1 < bq/Bc.
Proof. See [FV12, thm. 1].
The authors of [FV12] also provide a way of bootstrapping the above scheme to be fully




Microsoft’s SEAL adds several optimizations to the classical BFV scheme we looked at.
We will discuss some of those optimizations in this chapter.
4.1 Number Theoretic Transform
In this section we will discuss the number theoretic transform (NTT). This is used to speed
up polynomial multiplication.
4.1.1 Discrete Fourier Transform
First we recall the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
Definition 4.1. Given an input vector xn = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Cn, let ωn = e
−2πi
n be a
















The DFT can be computed naively in O(n2) time. The fast Fourier transform(FFT) is
a more efficient algorithm that runs in O(n log n) time. Polynomial multiplication can per-
formed naively in O(n2) time. To speed this up, we take the FFT of a polynomial and perform
coordinate-wise multiplication and follow that with an inverse-FFT to achieve polynomial
multiplication in O(n log n).
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4.1.2 Finite Fields
The DFT can be generalized to work with fields besides C so long as ωn is a primitive nth
root of unity. If we choose our field to be Z/pZ with p prime, we know there exists a primitive
root r ∈ Z/pZ. To compute the DFT of a sequence of n integers, we require a primitive nth
root of unity, ωn. By Dirichlet’s theorem on arithmetic progressions, there are infinitely many
primes p ≡ 1 (mod n), so we can always find p of the form p = kn+ 1 for some k ∈ Z. This
allows us to set ωn ≡ rk (mod p). Now ωnn ≡ rkn ≡ rp−1 ≡ 1 (mod p). We also have that
ωmn 6≡ 1 (mod p) for m < n, so ωn is a primitive nth root of unity as required.
We call this version of the DFT the number theoretic transform(NTT). It has similar
properties to the DFT. The main use of the NTT in various HE implementations is to speed
up the multiplication of ciphertexts.
4.2 FV Residue Number System
The residue number system (RNS) variant of the FV scheme was first introduced in [BEHZ17].
Since the ciphertext modulus q does not need to be prime, this scheme uses the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) representation of q. If q is chosen to be a product of “small”,
coprime moduli, the need for multiprecision arithmetic can be avoided. We can take “small”
to mean a machine word. The FV scheme needs to be modified slightly to be compatible with
these CRT representations of ciphertexts. The two functions that are not directly compatible
are multiplication and decryption of ciphertexts. This is due to the non-positional nature of
RNS. We first begin by defining several functions used throughout the scheme.
4.2.1 RNS Decryption
We recall that standard FV decryption consists of four steps:
1. Evaluate [ct(s)]q
2. Multiply by t
q
.
3. Round each coefficient to the nearest integer, rounding up in the case of ambiguity.
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4. Apply [·]t (reduce coefficients to the range [−t/2, t/2)).
The first and third steps can be done in RNS, but the other two steps need modifications to
work with RNS.
Definition 4.2. Let t, q, R,Rq as above. We define Division and Rounding in R[Y ] as












Ciphertexts are in Rq while messages are in Rt. The fourth step listed above involves
taking ciphertexts from Rq into Rt. It is easy to see that we cannot simply apply [·]t to each
component in RNS form. Instead, the idea is to use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to
convert an element from
∏n
i=1Rqi to an element in Rq, then reduce that element modulo ti
for each ti in t = t1t2 . . . tm.
Definition 4.3. The fast base conversion is a map
FastBconv : Rq → Rt
where q =
∏n
i=1 qi, t =
∏m
i=1 ti, and z = (z1 = z mod q1, . . . , zn = z mod qn). The goal is to
write z = (z′1 = z mod t1, . . . , z
′

















and is applied coefficient-wise.
It is worth noting that (4.1) does not give exactly z, but instead gives an extra multiple
of q. This is because the qis are typically chosen to be a word length, and so multiprecision
division is required, which is computationally expensive. The authors work around this by
dealing with this approximate result and adjusting it in a way that is faster than multipreci-
sion reduction modulo q.
The division and rounding steps do not work correctly in RNS. To get around this, the
authors of [BEHZ17] replace rounding with flooring. This obviously introduces an error term.
Lemma 1 of [BEHZ17] shows how to combine this error term with the error term introduced
from FastBconv, and lemma 2 of [BEHZ17] gives a method they call a γ-correction technique.
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5 Ring Expansion Factor
The ring expansion factor δR was first introduced in [LM06]. When we reduce a ring
element modulo an ideal generated by a polynomial f , it is possible for the infinity norm to
increase. The maximum size it can increase by is captured by δR. For the ring we typically
work with in ring-LWE, the maximum such growth is equal to the degree of f . As we have
seen in the previous chapters, this factor is important when it comes to providing an upper
bound on the noise of ciphertexts, and is also used to determine the maximum noise growth
when multiplying ciphertexts. For certain polynomials, it is possible for this growth to be
exponential, and in fact we will look at some examples where this is the case.
In this chapter, we will look at ring expansion factors for arbitrary polynomials. Further-
more, we will look at the growth of multiplying arbitrary polynomials and reducing them
modulo arbitrary ideals as well as those of the form xn + 1. We will provide some numerical
experiments which suggest that δR = n for the quotient ring Z[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉 is a significant
overestimate of the actual growth of the norm after reduction. It remains an open ques-
tion of how one might be able to exploit such average case improvements in cryptographic
applications where guaranteed correctness of decryption is a typical requirement.
5.1 Norm Growth
In the standard homomorphic encryption schemes, we will often want to multiply elements
together. Since we are working in a polynomial quotient ring, it is standard to reduce our prod-
ucts to their canonical representatives. The result of this reduction can cause the norm to grow
substantially. As shown in lemma 2.1, when working with the quotient ring Z[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉,
the maximum a norm can grow by is equal to n. We recall that reducing the product is
done by using the fact that xn ≡ −1 mod xn + 1. It is easy to cook up an ideal where the
norm can grow exponentially. A simple example is taking the ideal generated by xn − cxn−1
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for some constant c. Then xn ≡ cxn−1 and it is easily seen that xn+k ≡ ck+1xn−1 for any
positive integer k. In [LM06], the authors provide bounds on the expansion factor for a given
polynomial.
By sampling random elements in the ring Z[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉 with n a power of two, we can
try to see how elements grow from multiplication and reduction. The motivation behind this
is to see how close to δR the norms of elements actually grow by. We see that the actual norm
growth of these trials appears to be bounded as O(n0.58) on average.
If we can prove, that with great certainty, the likely growth of norms is much less than
the worst-case estimate of δR = n, then on average we can decrease all of the noise bounds
we showed in chapter 3 by choosing a smaller value than n. This has the effect of increasing
the number of levels of multiplication we can perform.
Histograms of the results of the above experiment are shown in Figure 5.1. When running
100,000 trials of multiplying polynomials and reducing them modulo xn + 1 for various n,
fitting various pdfs to the resultant norm growths using SciPy [VGO+20], selecting the best
candidate via the KS test (see B.2), we see that the norm growth appears to exhibit behaviour
similar to that of a log-normal distribution; for a definition of the log-normal distribution
along with a description of the parameters, see appendix B.1. Using the Python library, SciPy
[VGO+20], we computed what the expected maximum norm growth would be for the 99.9th
percentile. As a function of n, we observe that 99.9th percentile corresponds to ≈ n0.58.
As seen in table 5.1, in most instances the observed norm growth in Z[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉 appears
to exhibit log-normal behaviour. This is seen by comparing the values in the D-stat column
to the critical values listed at the top. The null hypothesis H0 is that the distribution is a
log-normal distribution. We reject H0 when the D-stat is greater than the critical value for
a given confidence level. We observe that the hypothesis H0 is sometimes rejected, implying
the norm growth does not come from a log-normal distribution. More experimentation may
be needed to say with confidence this comes from a log-normal distribution. For example, one
could try running these experiments using different software or libraries, comparing against
a different set of distributions, using different statistical tests, or using a different range for
sampling coefficients.
Remark 5.1. The outliers in the plots seem to occur for small values of n, even after re-
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Figure 5.1: Observed norm growth for power-two cyclotomic polynomials
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running the trials several times. This could be due the range used for sampling coefficients,
or that this distribution observation starts to break down at smaller values of n. The outlier
in figure 5.3 could be for the fact that we are measuring the inherently noisy part of the
distribution.
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Figure 5.2: Growth of estimated log-normal parameters
5.2 FV Noise Growth
In this section we will look at the noise growth from multiplication of arbitrary ciphertexts
in the classical FV scheme.
If we have some ciphertext ct = (c0, . . . , cn) encrypting some plaintext m = [m1 . . .mn]t
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Table 5.1: KS test statistics for norm growth in polynomial quotient rings of the form











x2 + 1 0.03819 < 0.001 2.97 x940 + 1 0.00384 0.104 49.9
x4 + 1 0.00782 < 0.001 3.13 x960 + 1 0.00405 0.074 50.5
x8 + 1 0.00319 0.258 4.28 x980 + 1 0.00302 0.319 51.0
x16 + 1 0.00141 0.988 5.92 x1024 + 1 0.00431 0.047 52.3
x32 + 1 0.00269 0.463 8.33 x1040 + 1 0.00257 0.521 52.6
x64 + 1 0.00183 0.887 11.9 x1100 + 1 0.00369 0.129 54.3
x128 + 1 0.00224 < 0.001 17.1 x1180 + 1 0.00435 0.044 56.4
x256 + 1 0.00245 < 0.001 24.8 x1240 + 1 0.00508 0.011 57.8
x320 + 1 0.00280 0.411 27.9 x1280 + 1 0.00294 0.350 58.9
x360 + 1 0.00400 0.080 29.8 x1360 + 1 0.00383 0.105 60.8
x400 + 1 0.00381 0.109 31.5 x1400 + 1 0.00519 0.009 61.8
x480 + 1 0.00409 0.069 34.8 x1440 + 1 0.00340 0.196 62.7
x500 + 1 0.00264 0.488 35.5 x1480 + 1 0.00502 0.012 63.9
x512 + 1 0.00357 0.154 35.9 x1500 + 1 0.00487 0.017 63.7
x560 + 1 0.00459 0.029 37.7 x1520 + 1 0.00393 0.089 64.6
x640 + 1 0.00366 0.137 40.6 x1580 + 1 0.00302 0.320 66.0
x700 + 1 0.00323 0.246 42.7 x1600 + 1 0.00335 0.209 66.3
x780 + 1 0.00332 0.218 45.2 x2048 + 1 0.00404 0.075 75.9
x860 + 1 0.00287 0.381 47.5 x4096 + 1 0.00456 0.031 110.1
x900 + 1 0.00333 0.215 48.6 x8192 + 1 0.00364 0.139 159.6
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Figure 5.3: Observed 99.9th percentile of the norm growth for 100,000 trials
and the secret key s needed to decrypt ct, then it turns out we can easily measure the noise













then we can isolate the noise simply by writing the above as[
n∑
i=0








For a Sage implementation of measuring noise using the above method, along with a toy
implementation of the FV scheme, see appendix A.
We can design an experiment similar to that in 5.1 by performing multiplications of
arbitrary ciphertexts and measuring the growth of their noise by equation (5.1). The detailed
method used is as follows:
1. Select the degree n of the polynomial modulus to work with.
2. Fix the error distribution χ with deviation σ = 3.19 so that it is B-bounded with
B ≈ 19.14.
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Table 5.2: Noise growth statistics and bounds for a single multiplication without
relinearization in toy FV implementation under the BKZ sieve cost model





1024 27 1 42 11
2048 54 3 49 16
4096 109 25 80 37
8192 218 54 138 67
3. Select a bit-length for q according to the suggested parameters in [ACC+18] for n
under the classical BKZ sieve cost model using the uniform ternary distribution for key
selection.
4. Select a plaintext modulus t such that the noise growth from a single multiplication
will still allow correct decryption.1
5. Generate random plaintext elements, encrypt them, perform a multiplication, and
record the noise growth relative to the ciphertext with the largest norm.
We are interested in how large the noise grows relative to the norm of a ciphertext. Figure
5.4 shows histograms for the above experiment with n = 1000 trials for each quotient ring,
and 5.2 shows the maximal noise growth observed under the given parameters along with the
maximal possible noise growth given in lemma 3.1. Examining the results in table 5.2, we
see that the maximal noise growth is 2-4 times that of the maximal observed noise growth
under a fixed set of parameters.
Using the experimental results in section 5.1, we can replace the ring constant δR = n
with the value γR = n
0.58, and can recompute the worst-case bounds for multiplication seen in
chapter 3. We emphasize here that working with γR is based only on experimental results, and
that we have not proven such a value is even justified. Table 5.3 shows the multiplicative depth
of the classical FV scheme using both δR and γR with the suggested parameters in [ACC
+18]
1There is no recommended way to select this parameter. It is dependent on the individual use case.
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Noise Growth in / x1024 + 1
1.38 1.40 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.50











Noise Growth in / x2048 + 1
3.60 3.62 3.64 3.66 3.68 3.70











Noise Growth in / x4096 + 1
6.50 6.52 6.54 6.56 6.58












Noise Growth in / x8192 + 1
Figure 5.4: Observed noise growth of 1000 trials of a single multiplication without
relinearization in toy FV implementation. See Table 5.2 for maximal growth values
with fixed parameters observed here.
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Table 5.3: Maximum multiplicative depth for classical FV with δR and γR using rec-
ommended parameters for 128 bit security in the classical case
n log2 q δR γR δR-depth γR-depth
1024 27 1024 55.72 0 1
2048 54 2048 83.29 1 3
4096 109 4096 124.50 3 6
8192 218 8192 186.11 7 13
16384 438 16384 278.20 14 26
32768 881 32768 415.87 28 49
for 128-bit security in the classical model. We recall from theorem 3.4 that the plaintext
modulus t has a role in determining the multiplicative depth, but we have dropped it from
these calculations since it is a user-defined parameter not impacting security. The parameter
t was left in table 5.2 because it was a required parameter in the toy FV implementation. We
see in table 5.3 that as long as t is chosen conservatively so as not to contribute too much
noise, we can approximately double the multiplicative depth of a classical FV circuit under
the γR assumption.
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6 Summary and Future Work
Since Gentry’s thesis in 2009, there have been significant contributions to the study of
homomorphic encryption cryptosystems. The hardness results are primarily based on the
LWE scheme and general, random lattices. As mentioned in chapter 1, the popular HE
libraries are based on the ring-LWE problem. Currently, the best-known attacks on ring-
LWE-based cryptosystems are not significantly better than attacks on general LWE-based
ones [ACC+18]. In section 2.3 we provided background for general cyclotomic fields, but
in this thesis we have primarily looked at power-two cyclotomic fields. Additionally, this is
what the state-of-the-art implementations use. While many of the results generalize to the
general cyclotomic case, it is not currently recommended to use non-power-two cyclotomics
[ACC+18].
Some of the main ring-LWE schemes [BGV14, FV12, BLLN13] are reliant on the ring
expansion factor δR for determining circuit depth. As seen in the experiments outlined in
chapter 5, the average-case growth of multiplication of ring elements appears to exhibit be-
haviour much better than the worst-case of δR = n. More work is needed to better understand
the noise growth of ring elements in power-two cyclotomics. It would be desirable to exploit
this average-case growth to increase circuit depth. We once again remark that circuit depth
is also dependent on the plaintext modulus t although security is not affected. In [Pla18],
they remark about the automatic parameter selection of SEAL without giving any concrete
method for choosing t. However, in issue #232 on the SEAL GitHub repository, one of the
lead developers states that the automatic parameter selection was removed due to bugs.
In section 4.2 we introduced the RNS variant of the FV scheme [BEHZ17] used in SEAL.
At the time of this writing, there is no bootstrapping operation that is compatible with this
variant. The bootstrapping operation of the classical FV scheme appears to be incompatible
with the RNS variant. Microsoft seems to have chosen this variant because of its increased
40
performance, but it would be beneficial if it could be made into a fully homomorphic scheme
while still retaining the performance benefits.
41
References
[ACC+18] Martin Albrecht, Melissa Chase, Hao Chen, Jintai Ding, Shafi Goldwasser, Sergey
Gorbunov, Shai Halevi, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Kim Laine, Kristin Lauter, Satya
Lokam, Daniele Micciancio, Dustin Moody, Travis Morrison, Amit Sahai, and
Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Homomorphic encryption security standard. Technical
report, HomomorphicEncryption.org, Toronto, Canada, November 2018.
[Ajt96] M. Ajtai. Generating hard instances of lattice problems (extended abstract). In
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting, STOC ’96, page 99–108, New York, NY, USA, 1996. Association for Com-
puting Machinery.
[Ajt98] Miklós Ajtai. The shortest vector problem in l2 is np-hard for randomized re-
ductions. In Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, pages 10–19, 1998.
[APS15] Martin R Albrecht, Rachel Player, and Sam Scott. On the concrete hardness of
learning with errors. Journal of Mathematical Cryptology, 9(3):169–203, 2015.
[BEHZ17] Jean-Claude Bajard, Julien Eynard, M. Anwar Hasan, and Vincent Zucca. A full
rns variant of fv like somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes. In Roberto
Avanzi and Howard Heys, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2016,
pages 423–442, Cham, 2017. Springer International Publishing.
[BGV14] Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. (Leveled) fully ho-
momorphic encryption without bootstrapping. ACM Trans. Comput. Theory,
6(3):Art. 13, 36, 2014.
[BLLN13] Joppe W. Bos, Kristin Lauter, Jake Loftus, and Michael Naehrig. Improved
security for a ring-based fully homomorphic encryption scheme. In Cryptography
and coding, volume 8308 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 45–64. Springer,
Heidelberg, 2013.
[BLP+13] Zvika Brakerski, Adeline Langlois, Chris Peikert, Oded Regev, and Damien Stehlé.
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Appendix A




coeff_min , coeff_max = ceil(-coeff_mod /2), (coeff_mod -1) //2
g = 0
for i in range(f.lift().degree () + 1):
c = f[i] % coeff_mod





return sum((f[i] % coeff_mod)*x^i for i in range(f.lift().degree
() + 1))
class Ciphertext(object):
def __init__(self ,coeff_modulus , pt_modulus , ring , *elements):
if len(elements) == 1:






def __add__(self , c2):
if len(self) != len(c2):
raise ValueError("Ciphertexts need to be the same size")
temp = [self.R(reduce_and_centre(sum(x),self.coeff_modulus))
for x in zip(self.elements , c2.elements)]
return Ciphertext(self.coeff_modulus , self.pt_modulus , self.
R, *temp)
def __sub__(self , c2):
if len(self) != len(c2):
raise ValueError("Ciphertexts need to be the same size")
temp = [self.R(reduce_and_centre(x[0] - x[1]),self.
coeff_modulus) for x in zip(self.elements , c2.elements)]
return Ciphertext(self.coeff_modulus , self.pt_modulus , self.
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R, *temp)
def __mul__(self , c2):
q = self.coeff_modulus
t = self.pt_modulus
# this allows us to multiply by an integer plaintext , since
multiplication
# by an integer works the usual way.
if isinstance(c2, Integer):
temp = [reduce_and_centre(c2*c, self.coeff_modulus) for
c in self.elements]
return Ciphertext(q, t, self.R, *[c2*self[i] for i in
range(len(self))])
elif isinstance(c2 , Ciphertext):
temp = [0]*( len(self) + len(c2) - 1)
for i in range(len(self)):
for j in range(len(c2)):
temp[i + j] += self[i]*c2[j]
c1c2 = []
for c in temp:
c1c2.append(self.R(
reduce_and_centre(
self.R(sum(round(t/q*c[i])*x^i for i in
range(c.lift().degree () + 1))), q)))
return Ciphertext(q, t, self.R, *c1c2)
else:
return TypeError("c2 is not of type Ciphertext or
Integer")
def __rmul__(self , c2):
if isinstance(c2, Integer) or isinstance(c2 , Ciphertext):
return self*c2
else:
raise TypeError("c2 is not of type Ciphertext or Integer
")










def __add__(self , f):
temp = reduce_and_centre(self.msg + f.msg ,self.coeff_modulus
)
return Plaintext(self.coeff_modulus , self.R, temp)
def __sub__(self , f):
temp = reduce_and_centre(self.msg - f.msg , self.
coeff_modulus)
return Plaintext(self.coeff_modulus , self.R, temp)
def __mul__(self , f):
if isinstance(f, Integer):
tmp = reduce_and_centre(self.msg*f, self.coeff_modulus)
return Plaintext(self.coeff_modulus , self.R, tmp)
elif isinstance(f, Plaintext):
temp = reduce_and_centre(self.msg*f.msg , self.
coeff_modulus)
return Plaintext(self.coeff_modulus , self.R, temp)
else:
raise TypeError("f is not of type Plaintext or Integer")
def __rmul__(self , f):
if isinstance(f, Integer) or isinstance(f, Plaintext):
return self*f
else:
raise TypeError("f is not of type Plaintext or Integer")
def __getitem__(self , i):
return self.msg[i]
def __eq__(self , f):




# parms = [poly_modulus_degree , coeff_modulus , plain_modulus]
# in FV , these are [n, q, t].
def __init__(self , parms):
self.n, self.q, self.t, self.T = parms
R.<x> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
self.R = R.quotient(x^self.n + 1)
self.l = floor(log(self.q, self.T))




self.chi = RealDistribution(’gaussian ’, self.std_dev)
def gen_secret_key(self):
s = sum(randint (-1,1)*x^i for i in range(self.n))
return self.R(s)
def gen_pub_key(self , s):
a = self._sample_uniform ()
e = self._sample_chi ()
return [self.R(reduce_and_centre(-a*s + e, self.q)), a] # we
need to reduce that first part modulo q and centre it
def gen_relin_key_v1(self , s):
rlk = []
s_squared = s*s
for i in range(self.l + 1):
a_i = self._sample_uniform ()
e_i = self._sample_chi ()
rlk.append ((self.R(reduce_and_centre ((-(a_i*s + e_i) + (
self.T^i)*s_squared),self.q)), a_i))
return rlk
def encrypt(self , pk , m):
u, e1, e2 = self._sample_chi (), self._sample_chi (), self.
_sample_chi ()
p0 , p1 = pk
c0 = self.R(reduce_and_centre(p0*u + e1 + floor(q/t)*m.msg ,
self.q))
c1 = self.R(reduce_and_centre(p1*u + e2 , self.q))
return Ciphertext(self.q, self.t, self.R, c0 , c1)
def decrypt(self , s, ct):
m_noisy = (t/q)*self.R(reduce_and_centre(sum(ct[i]*s^i for i
in range(len(ct))), self.q))
# To get rid of the noise , we round each coefficient.
m_bar = self.R([ round(coeff) for coeff in m_noisy ])
return Plaintext(self.t, self.R, reduce_and_centre(m_bar ,
self.t))
def relinearize(self , rlk , ct):
if len(ct) != 3:
raise ValueError("Can only relinearize ciphertexts with
3 elements")
c0 , c1 , c2 = ct
c2_sliced = self._base_convert(c2)
if len(c2_sliced) != len(rlk):
raise ValueError("c2_sliced is not the same length as
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rlk for some reason.")
c0_prime = self.R(reduce_and_centre(c0 + sum(rlk[i][0]*
c2_sliced[i] for i in range(len(rlk))), self.q))
c1_prime = self.R(reduce_and_centre(c1 + sum(rlk[i][1]*
c2_sliced[i] for i in range(len(rlk))), self.q))
return Ciphertext(self.q, self.t, self.R, c0_prime , c1_prime
)
# Used for creating a specific plaintext message. This should
probably go in the Plaintext class ,
# but I’d need a nicer way to pass our quotient ring to the
Plaintext class.
def plain(self , msg):
return Plaintext(self.t, self.R, msg)
def random_plain(self):
coeff_min , coeff_max = ceil(-self.t/2), (self.t-1) //2
msg = self.R(sum(randint(coeff_min , coeff_max)*x^i for i in
range(self.n)))
return Plaintext(self.t, self.R, msg)
def _sample_uniform(self):
coeff_min , coeff_max = ceil(-self.q/2), (self.q-1) //2




for i in range(self.n)))
# Decomposes a polynomial in R_q to one in R_T.
def _base_convert(self , f):
rebased = []
f = self.R(least_positive_residue(f, self.q))
T = self.T
for i in range(self.l + 1):
tmp = self.R(reduce_and_centre(self.R(sum(((f[j])%T)*x^j
for j in range(self.n))), self.T))
rebased.append(tmp)
f = (f - tmp)*(1/T)
return rebased
# Takes as input the secret key s, plaintext pt, and its
corresponding ciphertext ct.
def noise(s, pt , ct , R):




cs = R(sum(ct[i]*s^i for i in range(n)))






This appendix serves as a refresher for some basic results and techniques from statistics.
Information on the log-normal distribution may be found in most undergraduate textbooks
on statistics. We will also use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [MJ51]. The methods below are
implemented in most statistics libraries, and in this thesis we use the ones implemented in
SciPy [VGO+20].
B.1 Log-normal Distribution
Let Y be a random variable that is normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation
σ. If X is a random variable such that X = exp(Y ), then we say X is a log-normal distribution
parameterized by µ and σ.
With this parameterization for X, we can find its probability distribution function (pdf)
fX(x). If we let FX(x) be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of X, then we recall




We note that X only takes positive values. Then we have
FX(x) = Pr(X ≤ x)
= Pr(lnX ≤ lnx)































It is easily seen that the median and standard deviation of X are eµ and eσ respectively. It





An alternative parameterization is to take s = eµ to be the shape parameter, σ to be the
scale parameter, and λ to be the location parameter.
When one wants to compute percentiles of a log-normal distribution, a näıve and often
common approach is to compute the percentile of its corresponding normal distribution, and
then back-transform the result via exponentiation; this is the implementation in [VGO+20].
B.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test) is a goodness-of-fit test used to determine if a sample
is from a particular continuous probability distribution. The KS test is a non-parametric test.
In other words, it makes no assumption about the underlying distribution. Non-parametric
tests are often used when we do not know what distribution the samples are coming from.
The KS test measures the differences between the empirical cdf Fn(x) and the cdf F (x)
of the reference distribution to be tested. The KS test returns a test statistic
D = sup
x
|Fn(x)− F (x)| .
For a given significance level α, we can find critical values for D. In practice, these critical
values are found in software and so we do not present them here. If D is less than the critical
value for α, we fail to reject the null hypothesis H0 that the samples are from the distribution,
and we reject H0 if D exceeds the critical value.
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